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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ALAN KIHLSTROM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981888-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of 
the State's case-in-chief? The appellate court will uphold a trial court's decision to 
submit a case to the jury if, "upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be 
reasonably drawn from it, [the court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State 
v. Dibello. 780 P.3d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)). 
2. Did the trial court properly give jury instruction #22, which, along with other 
jury instructions, defined for the jury a "purpose to defraud"? "[The appellate court] 
review[s] jury instructions under a correctness standard, granting no particular deference 
to the trial court." State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah App. 1998) (citations 
omitted). "Also, '[the appellate court] review[s] jury instructions in their entirety to 
determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the 
applicable law.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
3. Did the prosecutor's unsupported suggestion that defendant was avoiding the 
police and the prosecutor's mistaken assertion that defendant had testified to receiving 
only one rather two stolen checks constitute prosecutorial misconduct? On appeal, the 
reviewing court undertakes an independent review to determine whether the prosecutor's 
remarks "called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in reaching a verdict" and were prejudicial. State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 
1296 (Utah App. 1994)(citation omitted). Where a defendant fails to object to improper 
remarks, the appellate court may review the claim of misconduct for plain error. See 
State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Plain error is found if the court concludes: "an error exists, it 
should have been obvious to the trial court, and it was harmful." Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. 76-6-501 (Supp. 1999) - Forgery - "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters 
any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or 
the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of 
another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a 
copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information 
including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or 
writing issued by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument 
or writing representing an interest in or claim against 
property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Alan Kihlstrom, was charged with forgery (R. 4-6). A jury found him 
guilty as charged (R. 94). The trial court sentenced him to a statutory zero-to-five year 
term in the Utah State Prison and ordered him to pay restitution (R. 102-03). Defendant 
filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 106). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the fall of 1996 Furst Construction ("Furst"), located in West Valley City, 
discovered checks from its 18,000 series had been stolen when unauthorized checks 
began appearing on the company's bank statement (R. 125:97-98). Within a two-month 
period approximately twelve of the stolen checks were drawn on Furst's account (R. 
125:98). Furst notified the police, stopped payment on all checks in the 18,000 series, 
and closed the bank account on which the checks were being drawn (R. 125: 98-99). 
In early April 1997, defendant presented a check for $1,346.28 to Karl Anderson, 
an employee at Bill's Lounge in Magna, and requested that the check be cashed (R. 
124:9, 33, State's Ex. 1). The check, numbered 18871 and dated April 2, 1997, was from 
Furst. It was one of the stolen checks and the basis for the forgery charge (R. 4-5, 125:97, 
99). The check was made payable to "Kilstrom, Alan" and had a typewritten post office 
box address in Gillette, Wyoming (R. 124: 9, State's Ex. 1). As identification, defendant 
presented a Wyoming commercial driver's license which listed the same post office box 
address as on the check (R. 124:9-10, 35, 40-41). Defendant, however, had not lived in 
Wyoming for more than five years (R. 124:42). Defendant later testified that giving his 
Wyoming post office box, instead of his current address in Magna, "saves me a lot of 
problems" in verifying his identification (R. 124:43). Defendant admitted providing an 
incorrect spelling to a Mike Workman, the individual from whom defendant allegedly 
received the check (R. 124:43-44). 
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Following normal procedures, Anderson wrote the commercial driver's license 
number and defendant's social security number on the check (R. 124:9-10). Also in 
accord with the lounge's policy, Anderson obtained defendant's fingerprints (R. 124:7, 
19). Defendant was required to place two fingerprint identifications on the check because 
the first fingerprint was unclear and could not be used as an identification (R. 124:18). 
The second fingerprint is of defendant's right index finger (R. 124:18). Anderson then 
cashed the check and gave the stated amount of money to defendant (R. 124:4). 
Again in early April, 1997, defendant presented a second check at Bill's Lounge 
and received cash in return (R. 124:51, 62). This check, numbered 18434 and also stolen 
from Furst, was made out to defendant in excess of $1,300 (R. 124:35, 48, 58). 
Anderson wrote defendant's Wyoming commercial driver's license number on the check 
(R. 124:64). This time defendant satisfied the required fingerprint identification with a 
print of his thumb (R. 124:64, 66). 
Vern Beesley, a Deputy Sheriff assigned to the Crime Lab at the Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Office, testified that the fingerprints on the checks were those of defendant (R. 
124:19,66). 
As a result of Furst's stop payment order, neither check was paid and Bill's 
Lounge suffered a loss of approximately $2660.00 (R. 124:5, 62). 
Defendant had never worked for Furst and had never been issued a check by Furst 
(R. 125:101; 124:58-59). He was not authorized to have either of the checks which he 
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cashed at Bill's Lounge (R. 125:101; 124:58-59). Further, checks from Furst could only 
be signed by Furst's president, vice-president or the financial officer, and neither of the 
checks defendant presented for payment were signed by any of these persons (R. 125:100; 
124:58-59). The signature on check 18871, the check at issue, was a stamped signature 
and was nor the stamped signature of any person authorized to sign the check (R. 125: 
100). The signature on the second check was also not signed by an authorized person and 
different from that on the first check (R. 124:58-59). 
Defendant testified, identifying himself as a thirty-five-year-old self-employed 
automobile mechanic who worked out of his home (R. 124:28). Although he made no 
mention of it to anyone in law enforcement (R. 124:38), he testified that in March, 1997, 
he met a Mike Workman through "a friend of a friend" (R. 124:29-30). Workman, 
defendant claimed, requested that defendant replace the head gasket on a truck (R: 124:30, 
39). Defendant recalled the truck being white, looking like a construction truck, with 
signs on the doors and a box in the back, but did not recall what the signs said or if they 
indicated "Furst Construction" (R. 124:29, 31). He testified that when he received check 
number 18871 it was already filled out (R. 124:41). Workman's name was not anywhere 
on the check (R. 124:45). Defendant had no records of any of the work he allegedly 
performed for Workman (R. 39,44, 52). Notwithstanding his assertion that he innocently 
assumed that Workman was an agent of Furst, that he had no knowledge that either check 
was forged, and that he later tried to locate Workman, by the time of trial defendant had 
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still not attempted to locate Workman through those who had allegedly introduced 
Workman to him (R. 124:37-39,45-46, 52). 
Defendant claimed that a month after he had worked on the first truck, Workman 
brought another pickup for an engine replacement (R. 124:47-48). This vehicle, however, 
did not have signs on its side and did not appear to be a company vehicle. Nonetheless, 
defendant accepted another Furst check, numbered 18434, in excess of $1300.00 (R. 
124:48). This check was also stolen from Furst, bore an unauthorized signature, and was 
not signed by Workman (R. 124:49, 58-59). When questioned about the amount, 
defendant changed his testimony to add that Workman had brought in a "couple" of other 
vehicles as well (R. 124:56-57). Defendant then recalled two to three other vehicles 
which, in addition to the original truck, were paid for by the first check (R. 124:57). 
Defendant testified that he received the checks a few weeks apart (R. 124:50). But 
check number 18434, which defendant claimed he received a few weeks after receiving 
the first check, was dated April 1, 1997 and was cashed on April 7, 1997 (R. 124:60). 
The check at issue, check number 18771, dated April 2, 1997, was cashed on April 10, 
1997 (R. 124:60). Also, defendant testified that he had never been to Bill's Lounge prior 
to cashing check 18771 (R. 124:33, 52-53). However, check number 18434, cashed prior 
to the check at issue, was also cashed at Bill's Lounge (R. 124:51, 53). 
The jury found defendant guilty of forgery (R. 124:94). 
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SUMMARYOF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss, which was made at 
the close of the State's case and not later renewed. At the close of its case-in-chief, the 
State had established that defendant had cashed a stolen, forged check from the payor 
indicated on the check and that the payor had never employed defendant or issued him an 
authorized check. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have applied the 
well-established inference that possession of a stolen instrument is prima facie evidence 
of intent to defraud. Furthermore, the testimony of defendant and of the State's rebuttal 
witnesses, introduced after defendant made his motion to dismiss, made even clearer that 
the evidence of defendant's intent to defraud was not so sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds would have entertained a reasonable doubt 
of defendant's guilt. 
POINT II 
The challenged jury instruction is substantially modeled on an instruction 
approved not only by this court, but also by the United States Supreme Court and 
correctly allows the jury to infer defendant's intent to defraud from the falsity of the 
check defendant passed. The instruction implicitly acknowledges defendant's right to 
offer evidence to explain his possession of a forged check, and expressly states that the 
inference is merely permissive. Even if the instruction does not fully encompass the 
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State's burden in proving defendant's purpose to defraud, the instructions as a whole, 
coupled with remarks of both the prosecutor and defense counsel, exhaustively explained 
the required showing to the jury. 
POINT III 
The prosecutor's cross-examination did not constitute misconduct. In the first 
alleged instance, defendant fails to show plain error where the prosecutor was prepared in 
good faith to rebut defendant's testimony that he was not avoiding the police, but was 
unable to produce the witness. In the second alleged instance, defendant fails to show 
that the prosecutor's characterization of defendant's testimony was improper in the light 
of all the evidence before the jury. Even if both claimed instances of misconduct were 
error, they were harmless in light of much more prejudicial evidence properly admitted in 
the course of cross-examination and the compelling evidence of defendant's guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS MADE AT THE END OF DEFENDANT'S CASE-IN-
CHIEF BECAUSE THERE WAS EVIDENCE SHOWING 
DEFENDANT CASHED A STOLEN, FORGED CHECK, EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT TO INFER INTENT TO DEFRAUD 
A. The Standard of Review, 
On a motion for a directed verdict, "the trial court should dismiss the charge if the 
State did not establish a prima facie case against the defendant by producing 'believable 
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.'" State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781, 787 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) (citations 
omitted)). This Court will uphold a trial court's decision to submit a case to the jury if, 
"upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, 
[the court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find 
that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Davis. 965 P.2d 525, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Dibello. 780 P.3d 1221, 
1225 (Utah 1989)). In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a trial court's 
denial of a motion to dismiss or for directed verdict, "the record must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State." State v. Thatcher. 108 Utah 63, 68 157 P.2d 258, 260 
(1945). Further, review of the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss made after the 
State's case-in-chief does not include evidence subsequently introduced by defendant. 
State v. Tavlor. 818 P.2d 561, 573-74 (Utah App. 1991) (finding prima facie case based 
on facts established at the close of the State's case-in-chief).1 
B. The State Presented Facts and Reasonable Inferences Drawn from 
Those Facts From Which the Jury Could Have Found that Defendant 
Committed Forgery Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-501 (Supp. 1999), providing for forgery, states in pertinent 
1
 Defendant made a motion to dismiss the case at the close of the State's case-in-
chief, claiming that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud (R. 124:22). 
Defendant did not renew his motion at the close of all the evidence, nor on appeal has he 
claimed a general insufficiency of evidence, limiting his claim only to the trial court's 
denial of his motion. Br. of App. at 2, 9. 
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part, that ;*(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetuated by anyone, he . . . (b) makes, 
completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any WTiting so 
that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the person 
is existent or nonexistent " At the close of the State's case-in-chief, the State had 
established that: 
1. In the fall of 1996, checks were stolen from Furst. These checks were 
from the 18,000 series (R. 125:97-98). 
2. Furst notified the police, advised the bank to stop payment on the entire 
series and closed the account (R. 125:98-99). 
3. In the spring of 1997, defendant presented one of the stolen Furst 
checks for payment at Bill's Lounge in Magna, Utah. (R. 125:97-99; 
R. 124:9; State's Ex. 1). The check was made payable to defendant 
and listed his address as a post office box in Gillette, Wyoming (R. 
124:9). 
4. Defendant presented a Wyoming driver's licence for identification. He 
also supplied his social security number and placed two fingerprint 
identifications on the check. The first fingerprint identification was 
unclear, requiring defendant to place his fingerprint on the check 
again before it could be cashed (R. 124:9-10, 18-19). 
5. The fingerprints on the check were those of the defendant (R. 124:19). 
6. Bill's Lounge cashed the check for defendant (R. 124:4). 
7. Defendant accepted the money (R. 124:4). 
8. Payment was stopped on the check. When Bill's Lounge called Furst 
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to discovery why, they were informed that the check had been stolen 
(R. 124:5). 
9. Defendant was not known to Furst, had never worked for Furst, had 
never been issued a check from the company, and was not authorized 
to have a check from Furst (R. 125:100-102). 
10. The signature on the check was not the signature of any of the three 
persons authorized to sign checks at Furst (R. 125:100). 
Defendant argued only that because the State had not produced any evidence that 
defendant either stole the check or knew that it was stolen, and by inference therefore 
knew the check was false, the State had failed to show that he uttered the check with an 
intent to defraud (R. 124:22-26).2 However, defendant's challenge falls short: 
In a prosecution for uttering, as in the case forging an instrument, the 
unexplained possession of a forged instrument that the defendant utters or 
offers to utter gives rise to an inference that he either forged the instrument 
or knew it to be forged, or to a presumption that he knew of the forger, 
which presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of a reasonable 
explanation. 
36 Am. Jur. 2d Forgery § 44 ( ) . 
This well-established doctrine, that a defendant's unexplained possession of a 
2
 On appeal, defendant additionally argues that although he passed ("uttered") the 
stolen check, in doing so he "purported" to act only for himself, and so the State failed to 
show that his passing the check was "purportedly the act of another" thereby suggesting 
that the State's proof also lacks an actus reus.." Br. of App. at 11-12. However, 
defendant did not challenge this alleged failure of the State's proof at trial, and so this 
argument has not been preserved for appeal. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 654 
(Utah App. 1997) (declining to consider claim first raised on appeal). Further, defendant 
misapprehends that the actus reus element of the forgery statute, to wit: that the actor 
"makes . . . or utters any writing so that the writing . . . purports to be the act of another," 
refers in this case to defendant's uttering a check purporting to be an act of Furst, not 
himself. This distinction is clearly made in the elements instruction, which defendant 
also did not challenge in the trial court and has not challenged on appeal (See jury 
instruction #19). 
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forged instrument which he also utters gives rise to the inference that he knew the 
instrument to be forged, has long standing in Utah. In State v. Lanos. 63 Utah 151,155, 
223 P. 1065, 1066 (1924), the defendant challenged the admissibility of other forged 
checks offered by the prosecution to show an intent to defraud. The court found 
"untenable" the defendant's claim that such evidence was incompetent "unless it is also 
shown that the defendant had guilty knowledge of the falsity of the instruments when they 
were passed by him," stating: 
"The falsity of the other articles (forged or counterfeit) uttered or possessed 
must of course be shown. But the defendant's knowledge of their falsity 
need not be shown. The very kernel of the principle (either knowledge or 
intent) is that the fact of the uttering tends, in one way or another, to show 
the defendant's knowledge at the time in issue, either by the probable 
warning received, or by the improbability of innocent intent in repeated 
instances; and the assumption throughout is that the bare fact of utterance 
shows this." [Emphasis added.] 
Id., 223 P. at 1066-67 (quoting 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 317 (2nd ed.), and citing with 
approval Underbill's Criminal Evidence § 629 (3rd ed.), 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 
35 (10th ed.) and 2 Wharton Criminal Law § 920 (11th ed.)). 
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed Utah's long-standing acceptance of the guilty 
inference recognized in Lanos in State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985). In 
Williams, the defendant, convicted of forgery, gave a check in payment for a car repair. 
Id., 712 P.2d at 221. As in this case, the State presented evidence that the check had been 
stolen from the repair shop owner's home office, that the owner did not know defendant, 
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had never employed him, did not owe him money and that he had not written the check 
nor authorized anyone to do so. Id at 223. Noting that the ff [defendant presented no 
evidence to controvert the logical inferences which could be drawn by the jury, i.e., that 
without any explanation as to where he got the check or from whom, the defendant knew 
the check was forged," the court rejected a claim of insufficient evidence, holding that 
"[t]he evidence against defendant was not so inherently improbable that it would 
necessitate a reasonable doubt in the minds of reasonable persons as to his guilt." Id.3 
In denying defendant's motions at the close of the State's case-in-chief, the trial 
court noted: "You have a victim. You have a benefit conferred, and a trier of fact could 
conclude from those facts that the defendant either stole the check and had somebody fill 
it out and he cashed it, or someone stole the check and filled it out. And the defendant 
cashed it for part or all of the proceeds" (R. 124:26). Thus, although its expression of the 
3
 The inference applied in Lanos and Williams has also been recognized in other 
jurisdictions. See, eg,, State v. DeGina. 256 S.E.2d 275, 278 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) 
("[W]e hold that the inference that one who utters a forged instrument and thereby 
endeavors to obtain money or advances upon it either forged or consented to the forging 
of the instrument is not violative of due process."); Snider v. State, 108 P.2d 552, 557 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1940) ("If the state proves passing of a forged instrument, the intent to 
defraud in many instances may be inferred from the act of uttering such an instrument"); 
State v. Woods, 206 S.E.2d 509, 514-15 (W. Va. 1974) (finding proper jury instruction 
which stated "unexplained possession of a forged instrument by one who endeavors to 
obtain money thereon is prima facie evidence that such person forged the instrument"). 
Moreover, the validity of the inference is attested to by its application by Utah's appellate 
courts to other offenses which, like forgery, must frequently be proven by circumstantial 
evidence; for example, possession of recently stolen property without a satisfactory 
explanation for the possession is prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole 
the property. See State v. Graves, 717 P.2d 717, 717-18 (Utah 1986) (upholding guilty 
verdict when defendant failed to present any explanation to his possession of stolen 
vehicle); State v. Davis. 965 P.2d 525, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (inference of 
knowledge that property stolen proper when no plausible explanation is offered). 
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time-honored inference is somewhat abbreviated, trial court correct!}* recognized that 
from defendant's passing a forged, stolen check, the jury could reasonably infer that 
defendant knew that it was false and passed it with intent to defraud. 
In sum, at the close of the State's case-in-chief, the prosecution had proven that 
defendant had cashed a stolen, forged check from Furst and that Furst had never 
employed defendant or issued him an authorized check. At this point in the trial, the 
evidence and the reasonable inference of defendant's intent to defraud was not so 
"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt." See Williams, 712 P.2d at 223 (citing State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). Therefore, the trial court correctly denied the motion to 
dismiss. 
As authority for his opposing claim, defendant cites two Texas cases, which 
happen to reject the inference that has already been approved in Utah. See Parks v. State, 
746 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), and Albrecht v. State. 486 S.W.2d 97, 102 
(Tex.Ct.App. 1972). 
Defendant also cites State v. Castonguay. 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983), for 
the proposition that the State must eliminate any other reasonable alternative hypothesis 
in proving the requisite intent for the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Br. of 
App. at 13-14. However, the facts and procedural circumstances that led the court in 
Castonguay to apply the alternative reasonable hypothesis doctrine are very different than 
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in this case. In Castonguay. the defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder 
for firing his rifle at a police officer. Id. at 1324-25. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
agreed with defendant that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to kill the officer 
in order to avoid arrest to support the conviction. Id. at 1326-27. However, the court 
supported this conclusion with facts adduced by both the prosecution and the defense, i.e., 
the entire body of evidence presented to the trier of fact, which clearly indicated that if 
the defendant had intended to kill the officer he could surely have done so. L± In the 
instant case, by contrast, defendant moved for a dismissal at the end of the State's case-
in-chief, when only evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer his intent to 
defraud had been presented, and before he testified to any alternative theory for his 
possessing the stolen check (R. 124:22).4 In short, a trial court is governed by the 
rebuttable presumption of guilty intent where the defendant has unexplained possession 
of stolen documents, and so cannot be required to grant a motion to dismiss where there is 
no evidence in support of some reasonable alternative hypothesis, especially in the face of 
4
 As noted earlier in this discussion, see Br. of Appellee at PtIA, only evidence 
presented at the time of the motion to dismiss is relevant to evaluating defendant's 
motion. See Taylor, 818 P.2d at. See also Nguyen v. State, 580 So. 2d 122, 122-23 (Ala 
Ct. App. 1991) (n[W]here the sufficiency of the evidence is tested by a motion for a 
judgment of acquittal, we may examine only that evidence which was before the court at 
the time the motion was made.") (citation omitted); State v. Hartman, 270 S.E.2d 609, 
611,613 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (considering only evidence introduced in state's case-in-
chief in determining motion to dismiss made at the close of the state's evidence, even 
though defendant later offered evidence of police entrapment). Thus, defendant's 
reference, with statutory citations, to his being a holder in due course, see Br. of App. at 
12, which was the entire theory of the defense and only presented when he testified 
following his motion to dismiss, is improper. 
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so well-established an inference of guilty knowledge as in the torgery context.5 
Even if evidence developed following defendant's motion to dismiss were 
considered by this Court, it becomes still clearer that there was sufficient evidence to 
support defendant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, for defendant's theory was 
untenable and his credibility doubtful. Following defendant's testimony and the State's 
rebuttal, the jury learned the following additional incriminating facts: 
1. Although defendant gave a Wyoming driver's license listing a 
Wyoming post office box as his mailing address, defendant had not 
lived in Wyoming for more than five years (R. 124:42). 
2. Defendant received another Furst check, numbered 18434, made out 
one day before the check from which the criminal charge stemmed, 
which he also cashed at Bill's Lounge (R. 124: 51, 62). 
3. The check numbered 18434 was also stolen from Furst, bore an 
unauthorized signature different from that on the first check, was 
made out in an amount in excess of $1300, and also returned unpaid 
(R. 124:35,48,58-59,62). 
4. Defendant used his thumb, rather than his index finger, to provide the 
requested fingerprint for Bill's Lounge (R. 124:64, 66). 
5. Defendant testified that he is a thirty-five year-old automobile 
mechanic who worked out of his home (R. 124:28). He claimed to 
have received both checks from a "Mike Workman" who brought a 
few vehicles to him for repair (R. 124:29-30,47-48). However, 
Workman's name was not anywhere on either check (R. 124:45, 
State's Ex. 1). 
5
 The Utah Supreme Court has granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari, 
challenging this Court's recent application of the "alternative reasonable hypothesis" 
doctrine in State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1998), cert, granted, _ P.2d _ 
(Utah, Aug. 11, 1998), which will be argued on April 6, 1999. 
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6. Defendant also admitted providing an incorrect spelling to a Mike 
Workman, the individual from whom defendant allegedly received 
the check (R. 124:43-44). 
These facts, and particularly defendant's passing a second check within, at most, a 
few days, in conjunction with the facts developed in the State's case-in-chief clearly 
indicate that defendant was aware that check numbered 18771 was not genuine. See 
State v. Green. 89 Utah 437, 452-53, 57 P.2d 750, 757 (1936) ("The inference of criminal 
or felonious intent arises from the repetition of instances, since the probability of innocent 
intent is minimized by each additional similar act."). 
Furthermore, defendant undermined his own credibility, and thereby further 
incriminated himself. See State v. John. 586 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1978) (noting where 
defendant presents alternative hypothesis that conflicts with State's evidence, jurors "are 
the exclusive judges of the credibility of the evidence" and thus may reject hypothesis 
lacking in "substantial and credible evidence.") (cited with approval in Layman, 953 P.2d 
at 787 n.4). First, defendant claimed that he had never been to Bill's Lounge prior to 
cashing the check at issue; however, the second check was paid on April 7, while the 
check at issue was paid on April 10 (R. 124:33, 52-53, 60). Further, defendant claimed 
he received the checks a "couple of weeks apart;" however, as just noted, the checks were 
paid three days apart (R. 124:47, 52, 60). Additionally, defendant claimed the check was 
in payment for work on a construction-like truck; however, when confronted with the fact 
that he received over $2600 within approximately three days, defendant changed his 
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testimony to say that the check at issue was payment for the truck plus one or two other 
cars and the second check was payment for another truck altogether (R. 124: 30, 56-57). 
Also, although defendant claimed the checks were for payment for automotive work, he 
could not produce any records of the transactions (R. 124:39,44,52). Most significantly, 
defendant claimed to have looked for Workman after defendant allegedly performed work 
for him, but failed to utilize the most obvious source, to wit: the "friends" who 
purportedly had introduced Workman to him, persons who also remained unnamed (R. 
124:37, 39). 
Finally, the jury was instructed that in convicting defendant "the evidence must, in 
your minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the 
defendant" (jury instruction #14, R. 78). In sum, even considering defendant's asserted 
reasonable alternative hypothesis, the evidence as a whole shows that there was sufficient 
evidence to support defendant's conviction. 
POINT II 
THE CHALLENGED INSTRUCTION STATED AN ALLOWABLE 
INFERENCE WHICH, TAKEN IN CONTEXT OF THE 
INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE AND IN LIGHT OF COUNSEL'S 
REMARKS, FULLY EXPLAINED THE STATE'S BURDEN TO 
PROVE THAT DEFENDANT PASSED A CHECK WITH 
KNOWLEDGE OF ITS FALSITY 
Defendant claims jury instruction #22 improperly directed the jury to infer his 
intent to defraud from the mere fact that check numbered 18771 was forged, thereby 
relieving the jury of its burden of finding his criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Br. of App. at 15-17. He further claims that he was prejudiced because the prosecution 
failed to show that he actually knew that the check was false. Br. of App. at 18. 
However, the challenged instruction is a correct and well-established statement of a 
permissible inference, especially where numerous instructions clearly required the jury to 
find actual intent to defraud before it rendered a guilty verdict and both the prosecutor's 
and defense counsel's closing arguments emphasized that actual intent was required. 
A. The Standard of Review, 
In State v. Lucero. 866 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993), this Court outlined the standard 
of review applied to a challenged jury instruction: 
A challenge to a jury instruction as incorrectly stating the law presents a 
question of law, which we review for correctness." State v. Archuleta, 850 
P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah), cert, denied. 510 U.S. 979 (1993). Jury instructions 
must be read and evaluated as a whole. State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 
1146 (Utah 1989). They must accurately and adequately inform a criminal 
jury as to the basic elements of the crime charged. State v. Roberts, 711 
P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985). However, if taken as a whole they fairly instruct 
the jury on the law applicable to the case, the fact that one of the 
instructions, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have been is not 
reversible error. State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981); State v. 
Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461, 470 (Utah App. 1993). 
Id at 3; see also State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 1994). 
"Jury instructions are to be considered and construed as a whole and reconciled 
whenever possible; conversely, they are not to be considered in isolation in order to 
predicate a claim of error. . . . It is presumed that the jury read and followed all of the 
court's instructions." State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 81 (Utah 1981) (Hall, J., dissenting). 
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A reviewing court will "reverse a trial court's decision on the basis of an 
instruction improperly submitted to the jury only where the party challenging the 
propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice stemming from the instructions 
viewed in the aggregate.,M Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah App.) 
(quoting State v. Haston. 811 P.2d929, 931 (Utah App. 199IX rev'd on other grounds, 
846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)1 cert, denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
B. Taking the Instructions as a Whole, Instruction 22 
Adequately Instructs on the Element of Intent 
Instruction 22 states: 
Intent to defraud is simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it 
were genuine in order to gain some advantage. 
A false writing has such an obvious tendency to accomplish fraud 
that you may infer such intent from the mere creation of an instrument that 
is false. 
(R. 102). 
Defendant argues that this instruction relieves the jury of its burden to find that 
defendant passed the check with criminal intent. However, as discussed at Point I of this 
brief, the instruction plainly expresses a time-honored inference in the law. In Barnes v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357 (1973), the defendant, convicted of uttering 
stolen checks, challenged the following jury instruction (as it was summarized by the 
Court): 
[Possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is 
ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the 
inference and find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the 
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evidence in the case, that the person in possession knew the property had 
been stolen. 
kL at 840, 93 S. Ct. at 2360. Supporting the instruction's constitutionality, the Court 
noted that "the challenged instruction only permitted the inference of guilt from 
unexplained possession of recently stolen property." Id. at 844-45, 93 S. Ct. at 2362 
(emphasis in original). However, the Court went on to say: 
Of course, the mere fact that there is some evidence tending to explain a 
defendant's possession consistent with innocence does not bar instructing 
the jury on the inference. The jury must weigh the explanation to determine 
whether it is "satisfactory."... The jury is not bound to accept the 
correctness of the inference. [Emphasis added.] 
Id at 844 n.9, 93 S. Ct. at 2362 n.9. See also State v. Carlson. 934 P.2d 657, 659-60 
(Utah App. 1997) (approving comparable jury instruction and citing Barnes with 
approval). 
Although jury instruction #22 did not contain the phrase, "if not satisfactorily 
explained," the import of that phrase is implicit in the instruction, for to maintain 
otherwise would be to nullify the common sense understanding that a criminal defense 
necessarily allows the explaining of one's conduct. Furthermore, if this common sense 
notion was not implicit in the instruction, then the language making the inference merely 
permissive, to wit: " . . . you may infer such intent from the mere creation of an instrument 
that is false," would be meaningless. In other words, as Barnes observed, the instruction 
gives the jury the freedom to reject the inference based on the evidence. See State v. 
Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1227 (Utah App. 1993) (finding proper jury instruction embracing 
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inference of criminal intent from possession of stolen property where the inference was 
only permissive). However, even if this Court concluded that the plain language of the 
instruction did not encompass the State's interpretation, it is apparent that the jury 
properly instructed. 
The law is well established that a jury instruction is not viewed in isolation from 
the charge as a whole. See Larsen, 876 P.2d at 396-97 (finding no error in the elements 
instruction which substituted the statutory term, "purpose to deprive," for "intent," 
particularly where five other instructions properly equated the two terms and stated the 
necessity of intent in proving criminal conduct); Lucero, 866 P.2d at 3 (recognizing that 
one part of the challenged instruction might be confusing viewed in isolation, but when 
considered with another instruction clarifying the confusing reference to intent, the 
instructions as a whole were neither inadequate nor misleading); accord State v. Dock. 
585 P.2d 56, 57 (Utah 1978) (harmless error for elements jury instruction to omit 
statutory requirement of assault, i.e., "intending to commit bodily injury," where other 
jury instructions defined and referenced statutory intent requirement). 
Rather than standing alone, instruction 22 is imbedded among thirteen other 
relevant instructions, including an elements instruction which defendant does not 
challenge on appeal. These instructions collectively define intent, instruct that intent is a 
necessary element of the charged offense, suggest how intent may by proven, place intent 
in the context of an actual, fact-based purpose to defraud, and urge the jury not to single 
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out any jury instruction, but to consider the instructions as a whole. Specifically, the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence as to every 
element of the offense, including an intent to defraud, is collectively discussed in the 
following instructions: 
#3 - "State has burden of proving each and all of the essential allegations 
thereof to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 66); 
#5 - "The law forbids you to be governed by mere conjecture " (R. 68); 
#7 - "[Y]ou should carefully and conscientiously consider and compare all 
of the testimony, and all of the facts and circumstances which have a 
bearing on any issue, and determine therefrom what the facts are" 
(R.71); 
#8 - "You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence.") (R. 72); 
#12 - "All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of 
innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he is proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 76); 
#13 - "An act committed or an omission made under an ignorance or 
mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense 
for that crime. Thus a person is not guilty of a crime if he commits 
an act or omits to act under an honest and reasonable belief in the 
existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true, would 
make such an act or omission lawful" (R.77) [Emphasis added.]; 
#14 - "To warrant you in convicting the defendant, the evidence must, to your 
minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt 
of the defendant. That is to say, if after an entire consideration and 
comparison of all the testimony in the case you can reasonably explain 
the facts given in evidence on any reasonable ground other than the 
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guilt of the defendant, you must acquit him (R. 78) [Emphasis added.]; 
#15 - "Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct 
and evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances" (R. 79) [Emphasis added.]; 
#17 - 'To constitute the crime in the information there must be the joint 
operation of two essential elements: conduct prohibited by law and 
the appropriate culpable mental state or states with regard to the 
conduct prohibited by law. Before a defendant may be found 
guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant... committed such conduct with the 
culpable mental state required for such offense (R. 81) [Emphasis 
added.]; 
#19 - "Before you can convict the defendant. Alan Kilstrom [sic] of 
the offense of Forgery as charged in the information, you must 
find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each 
and every one of the following elements of that offense:.... 
(5) That the said defendant then and there knew the writing was 
not the act of First [sic] Construction Company . . . : and 
(6) That the said defendant then and there had a purpose to defraud. 
If after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are 
convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
guilty of Forgery as charged in the information. If on the other hand, 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more 
of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not 
guilty (R. 83) [Emphasis added.]; 
#20 - "A 'purpose to defraud' is an intent to deceive another for the purpose 
of gaining some material advantage over him or to induce him to part 
with property, and to accomplish that purpose by some false statement, 
false pretense, or by any other artifice or act designed to deceive. 
(R. 84) [Emphasis added.]; 
#24 - "If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea has been stated in 
various ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be 
inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain 
sentence, or any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others. 
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but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard 
each in the light of the others (R. 88) [Emphasis added.]; and 
#25 - "If an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you find does 
not exist, you will disregard the instruction (R. 89). 
These instructions repeatedly condition the jury's determination of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt on its consideration of all the evidence in the case and its express 
finding that defendant had the required mental state to defraud by knowingly passing a 
check he knew was not authorized by Furst. In the face of such a focused and weighty 
directive, and particularly in light of the trial court's instruction to consider all the 
instructions in the light of the others, it is unreasonable to believe that the jury singled out 
instruction #22 to relieve itself of the duty to determine from the evidence whether 
defendant actually had a purpose to defraud in passing the check. 
Moreover, the arguments of counsel further directed the jury to the requirements of 
the law. In closing, the prosecutor read jury instruction #22 to the jury (R. 124:72). 
However, the prosecutor then immediately stated, "Well, I don't think you have to rely 
just on the fact that these documents were submitted. I think there's a number of other 
things in the case that tell you that the defendant knew he was dealing with forged 
documents when he presented these checks" (R. 72). The prosecutor then reviewed for 
the jury evidence proving defendant's guilty knowledge (R. 72-77). Similarly, in opening 
statement defense counsel warned the jury that in order to prove intent to defraud the 
prosecution was required to show that defendant presented the check knowing it was not 
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genuine (R. 125: 92-93). Counsel began her closing argument with that same central 
theme, which she returned to repeatedly (R. 124:87, 88).: 
Ladies and gentleman of the jury, you can't be guilty of forgery if 
you don't know the check that you're trying to cash is forged or stolen or 
that there's something wrong with it. [The prosecutor] used the word 
"bogus." That's right. You have to know it's a bogus check and be trying 
to trick somebody into cashing a bogus check for you. Alan's not guilty 
because he didn't know it was a bogus check, and he didn't have any reason 
to know it was a bogus check. 
(R. 124:77). In response, the prosecutor repeatedly accepted the burden of actually 
showing that defendant knew the check was not genuine (R. 124:88, 92- 93). 
In sum, even if this Court found jury instruction #22 did not correctly set out the 
State's burden of proof with respect to defendant' intent to defraud, the instructions as 
whole, coupled with both the prosecutor's and defense counsel's remarks, correctly 
instructed the jury on the required showing of criminal intent. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S 
SUGGESTION THAT HE WAS AVOIDING THE POLICE OR HAD 
TESTIFIED FALSELY CONSTITUTES MISCONDUCT AND THAT 
SUCH CROSS-EXAMINATION WAS PREJUDICIAL 
A. The Standard of Review, 
"The test for determining whether a prosecutor's statements at trial constitute error 
is whether the remarks 'called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in reaching a verdict.'" State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 
(Utah App. 1994)(citation omitted). "Only if the improper statements are deemed to be 
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harmful will they require reversal." Id, (citation omitted). 
However, in establishing a claim for prosecutorial misconduct, the defense must 
first preserve the issue in the record. "Failure to object to improper remarks will constitute 
a waiver of the claim unless the remarks constitute plain error." See State v. Emmett 839 
P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Plain error is found if the court concludes: "an error exists, it should have been obvious to 
the trial court, and it was harmful." Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342. A harmful error is one 
which "undermines [the court's] confidence in the verdict or, . . . there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome without the error." Id. (citations omitted). 
However, in State v. Young, the court held that " when there is strong proof of guilt, the 
conduct or remark of a prosecutor is not presumed prejudicial. 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 
1993). 
B. Defendant Fails to Establish Plain Error in the Prosecutor's 
Unsupported Suggestion that Defendant was Avoiding the Police, 
In the first instance of alleged misconduct, defendant claims that the State 
introduced unsupported innuendo when the prosecutor questioned him about Detective 
Townsend's efforts to contact him about the fraudulent check: 
Q[Pr]: Okay. When did you realize that the police were looking for you in 
connection with this check? 
A[Df]:When I did - -1 didn't know anything about this until I was arrested 
on a different warrant. 
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Q: Well, on this particular case weren't you aware in late May or early 
June that Detective Doug Townsend wanted to talk to you in 
connection with this check? 
A: No. 
Q: He didn't go to your house? Weren't you living with a young 
woman at the time, a Jenny, is it Tangloon? 
A: Tangloon. No, I wasn't, not at that time. 
Q: She didn't tell Officer Townsend that they were looking for you in 
late May or early June? 
A: I haven't talked to her for over a year. 
Q: Well, where were you in late May or early June? Were you out of 
state or in state? 
A: I was in state. 
Q: You were here. Were you ever trying to hide from the police in 
connection with this case? 
A: Not at all. 
Q: And you say you never learned about the check until when? 
A: December. 
Q: December of 1997? 
A: Yes, sir. 
(R. 124:40-41). 
Because defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's questioning, defendant's 
claim must be examined under the plain error doctrine, i.e., showing of obvious, harmful 
error. Admittedly, the prosecutor failed to introduce evidence to rebut defendant's 
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assertion that he was unaware of police efforts to contact him. However, that failure does 
not constitute misconduct in this case. 
First, the prosecutor's questions to defendant were evidently not posed in bad faith. 
See State v. Peterson. 722 P.2d 768, 769-80 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (implying that 
prosecutor's lack of good faith in Unsupported innuendo is significant in determining 
misconduct). Moreover, the questioning was not "egregious," sufficient to dispense with 
the "obviousness" requirement. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343 (dispensing with 
obviousness requirement because the prosecutor's repeated, unsupported innuendo that 
the child sex abuse defendant had admitted to the victim's stepfather "inappropriate 
feelings" toward the victim was so "egregious"). 
In this case, the prosecutor was prepared to call Detective Townsend at the very 
outset of trial, stating, "And we have one other witness, Doug Townsend, who is not here. 
He is also employed with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office" (R. 125:50). Thus, the 
trial court, as well as the parties, reasonably expected Detective Townsend to appear. 
Moreover, since Detective Townsend had investigated the case (R. 4-5), it seems 
reasonable that the prosecutor intended his appearance for the very purpose of supporting 
his suggestion that defendant was avoiding police contact. However, for unexplained 
reasons, Detective Townsend did not appear. 
Even if the prosecutor's cross-examination was obvious error, it plainly was not 
harmful. First, defendant prejudiced himself when, in response to the prosecutor's 
30 
suggestion that defendant knew the police were looking for him in connection with the 
check, he said, MI didn't know anything about this until I was arrested on a different 
warrant" (R. 124:40). Further, and particularly in the face of defendant's own damaging 
admission, the total effect of the prosecutor's unsupported suggestion was not prejudicial. 
See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 350 (recognizing that no individual error among the prosecutor's 
multiple instances of misconduct, including unsupported innuendo, were prejudicial). 
Further, to the extent that the prosecutor's suggestion was unsupported by evidence, its 
prejudicial effect was mitigated by jury instructions instructing the jury to consider only 
the evidence actually introduced at trial.6 Finally, as argued at Point IB above, the 
evidence showed that defendant cashed two forged checks within a few days in 
circumstances which clearly indicated defendant's knowledge that the check were not 
genuine, all of which evidence was lent greater weight by defendant's doubtful credibility 
about how he had obtained the checks. In sum, unlike State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 486-87 
(Utah 1984), the evidence in this case was sufficiently compelling to dispel any concern 
6
 Jury instruction #5 stated: "You are to be governed solely by the evidence 
introduced in this trial and the law as stated to you by [the court]. The law forbids you to 
be governed by mere conjecture . . . . " (R. 68). Jury instruction #16 instructed the jury 
that it "should not consider as evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial, 
unless such statement was made as a stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts" 
(R. 80). See also State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993) (finding that 
prosecutions remarks about evidence not introduced at trial not prejudicial when 
considered in context of evidence presented at trial and instructions to the jury); Peterson. 
722 P.2d at 770 (holding that in conviction for burglary, evidence presented at trial and 
jury instructions advising that statements of counsel were not evidence alleviated 
prosecutorial misconduct in unsubstantiated introduction of defendant's prior felony 
convictions). 
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that absent the prosecutor's remark there would have been a different result. 
C. Defendant Fails to Show Misconduct in Prosecutor's Cross-
Examination About the Number of Checks He Claimed to 
Have Received from Workman. 
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when, 
in cross-examining him about his prior dealings with Workman and the circumstances of 
his receiving the check, the prosecutor mischaracterized defendant's prior testimony and 
suggested that defendant was a liar. Br. of App. at 19-22. Defendant relies on the 
following cross-examination: 
Q: How many times did this man pay you? 
A: How many times? He paid me - -
Ms. Remal [Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. 
(R. 124:47). The court overruled defendant's objection and the prosecutor continued his 
line of questioning: 
Q: How many times did Mike Workman pay you? 
A: Two times. 
Q: Two times? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Didn't you just tell the jury it was only one time? 
A: No. 
(R. 124:47). Defendant's counsel objected once more, claiming that the prosecutor was 
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mischaracterizing the evidence. Once again the court overruled the objection. The State 
properly continued it's questioning: 
Q: Didn't you just a few minutes ago tell us that that was the only time 
he ever paid you? 
A: No, I didn't. 
Q: So now he did pay you twice? 
A: Yeah. 
(R. 124:47). 
The State acknowledges that defendant had not expressly testified that he was paid 
by Workman only once, as the prosecutor's questioning suggested. However, in the 
context of all the testimony, the suggestion is not clearly improper. Defendant testified 
for the first time on cross-examination that he had received two checks from Workman 
(R. 124:47). However, prior to that testimony, there was no evidence before the jury 
suggesting that defendant had passed more than one bad check. Indeed, the obvious 
theory of the defense was to show defendant's innocent state of mind by his limited 
dealings with Workman and Bill's Lounge, both of whom he claimed not to had any 
dealings prior to this incident, and his naive acceptance of the one check at issue (R. 
124:32-37, 41-46). Thus, the prosecutor's challenge was an understandable response to 
not only the general character of the defense, but also to the statement defendant had 
made just moments before, indicating that defendant had not previously met Workman 
(R. 124:46). 
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However, even if the prosecutor's statement was an erroneous mischaracterization 
of defendant's prior testimony, defendant was not prejudiced. First, any 
mischaracterization of the number of checks defendant had received would have been 
immediately apparent to the jury who had heard defendant's testimony. More 
importantly, the real prejudice stemmed not from any mischaracterization, but from the 
inevitable revelation that defendant had passed a second, forged, unauthorized, stolen 
check, the existence of which came to light immediately after the challenged cross-
examination (R. 124:47-53). Indeed, it is obvious that the prosecutor's asserted 
mischaracterization is nothing but a bridge to the proper, unchallenged introduction of 
much more damaging information. See Taylor. 884 P.2d at 1298 (no prosecutorial 
misconduct where the defendant subsequently admits prejudicial fact). Coupled with 
instructions (R. 68, 80) directing the jury to consider only the evidence and the 
compelling evidence of defendant's guilt, any error by the prosecutor was harmless.7 
7
 Because jury instruction #22 does not misstate the law and defendant's claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct are without merit, it is unnecessary for the State to address 
defendant's claim of cumulative error. Br. of App. at 22-23. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £ day of March, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert K. Heineman and Lisa J. Remal, Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Assoc, attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this b__ day of March, 1999. 
J ^ - ^ ^ ^ (^. / Q^fi-r-t^&t-Z 
35 
